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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant Richard Lynn Carlson objects to the State's 
attempt to redefine the issues presented for review on appeal. 
Instead of reviewing the issues as presented by the appellant, 
the State would prefer that this Court review a variation of 
those issues more favorable to it by presupposing legal 
conclusions. 
The first issue properly presented for review is whether the 
prosecutor's interrogation of the witnesses and argument to the 
jury were so improper and prejudicial as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial. The State presupposes the answer to this issue 
by inserting a legal conclusion irrelevant to the issue. The 
State claims that because the witnesses had a motivation to lie 
and defense counsel "supposedly" agreed with the prosecutor's 
statements, the prosecutor's improper conduct is excusable. This 
is an irrelevant side issue raised in an effort to remove this 
Court's focus from the gravity of the real issue. Even if true, 
the appellee's conclusions do not justify the Prosecutor's 
conduct at trial. 
The final two issues that defendant asks this Court to 
review are whether the prosecutor's misconduct was sufficiently 
obvious and harmful to constitute "plain error" and whether 
defense counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Appellant notes that when framing the 
1 
ineffective assistance issue, the State fails to acknowledge 
defense counsel's failure to object, which is supposedly so 
relevant to excuse the prosecutor's misconduct. 
Appellant asserts that any other issues are not relevant and 
should not be considered. Appellant, and not the State, has 




THE PROSECUTORS EXPRESSION OP HIS OPINION REGARDING THE 
CREDIBILITY OF DEFENSE WITNESSES CONSTITUTED MISCONDUCT 
REGARDLESS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OPINION 
The State excuses the prosecutor's prejudicial comments 
because the defendant's counsel "concurred." The prosecutor's 
comments regarding the credibility of defense witnesses were 
improper and prejudicial, regardless of whether defense counsel 
concurred. Whether defense counsel's actions were "ineffective 
assistance" does not excuse the prosecutor's misconduct. The 
Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that: 
A prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she 
asserts personal knowledge of the facts in issue or 
expresses personal opinion, being a form of unsworn, 
unchecked testimony [which] tend[s] to exploit the 
influence of the prosecutor's office and undermine the 
objective detachment that should separate a lawyer from 
the cause being argued. 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)(quoting State 
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988)). See also State 
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v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1989); ABA Standards of 
Criminal Justice, §3-5.8 (2d ed.1980). 
Such a rule could not be more clear. Plaintiff does not 
dispute the fact that the prosecutor's statements at issue are 
assertions of personal opinion. Rather, plaintiff claims that 
such statements are permissible under current Utah case law or, 
at a minimum, are acceptable because the prosecutor's opinion was 
confirmed by defense counsel. 
Plaintiff first tries to justify the prosecutor's improper 
statement by arguing the general principle that parties are 
awarded considerably more freedom in closing argument. (Appellee 
Brief at 9). However, this general rule does not supersede the 
well settled legal and ethical rules that it is improper for a 
prosecutor to express his personal opinion regarding the truth or 
falsity of any testimony, evidence or guilt of the defendant, 
whether in opening or in closing argument. No where do the above 
authorities make a distinction as to when a prosecutor may ignore 
his duty to refrain from improper expressions of personal 
opinion. Rather, the rule suggests that any expression of 
personal opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony, 
evidence or guilt of the defendant is improper and prejudicial. 
The State also refers to several comments made by the 
prosecutor at trial to which defense counsel lodged no objection. 
(Appellee Brief at 12). The State creates its own Hobson's 
choice. There was no objection to these comments either because 
3 
they were not improper, prejudicial or because defense counsel 
was ineffective in her assistance* 
Furthermore, a close comparison between one of these 
comments and one of the challenged comments reveals important 
distinctions. For the prosecutor to argue that witness Todd 
Dennis had a motive to lie to avoid a "snitch" label might 
arguably be a permissible inference which he could reasonably 
make from the evidence. See State v. Cumminsf 839 P.2d 848 (Utah 
App. 1992); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989). Such a 
characterization still permits a jury to weigh all the evidence 
and objectively reach its own conclusions about the credibility 
it should assign to the numerous inferences which may be drawn 
from the evidence. However, the statement, "the State admits 
defense witnesses have not been credible" sends an entirely 
different message to the jury. Through this statement, the 
prosecutor blatantly told the jury what to conclude regarding the 
defense witnesses' credibility instead of letting the jury reach 
its own conclusions from the evidence. The danger of this 
comment is discussed more fully in Appellant's Brief, p. 9. 
This prosecutorial comment is exactly the type of comment 
which the Court said was improper in State v. Hopkins. It seems 
difficult to imagine how a prosecutor could use more 
authoritative words than "...the defense witnesses have not been 
credible." The reasonable impact of these words is likely to 
induce the jury to trust the prosecutor's judgment regarding the 
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witnesses, rather than its own view of the witnesses and 
evidence. Id. 
Even the State recognizes the potency of its prosecutor's 
statement. In its brief, the State attempts to alter the record 
by suggesting that the prosecutor "submits" instead of "admits" 
(Appellee Brief at 12) in a vain attempt to ameliorate the 
impact. The record stands as it is, and cannot be changed by 
mere ellipses in a brief. The prosecutor's argument, as 
recorded, sends a powerful message to the jury regarding the 
testimony of the defense witnesses, a message not permitted. 
The prosecutor's statements to the jury were particularly 
potent in light of the mere circumstantial evidence of guilt and 
because this case hinged on witness credibility. At the outset, 
the trial judge recognized the prominent role that the witnesses 
would play: "At first glance, it would appear to me that 
credibility is going to be very important in this particular 
case." (R.9). The only evidence that the defendant was a 
perpetrator of the victim's injury was the testimony of what the 
victim claims he saw after a blanket was thrown over him to 
partially block his vision. (Appellant's Brief at 4-5). 
Therefore, this case was simply a case of who the jury was to 
believe; the testimony of the victim or the testimony of several 
defense witnesses. This is the very type of case a jury would be 
"especially susceptible to influence" by a prosecutor's comment 
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or suggestions. State v. Troy 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); See 
also Appellant's Brief at 11-12. 
While "the line which separates acceptable from improper 
advocacy is often difficult to draw," Hopkins at 480, appellant 
submits that the prosecutor clearly crossed that line in view of 
his comments and the lack of any direct evidence that the 
defendant was the perpetrator, other than the victim's testimony 
while his back was turned. The State's evidence of identity was 
weak in this case and the prosecutor knew that his case hinged on 
the credibility of his single "eye" witness. 
Whether subconsciously or intentionally, the prosecutor 
chose an improper tactic to influence the jury. Whether defense 
counsel arguably confirmed his opinion as to the credibility of 
the witnesses is irrelevant. At issue here is the prosecutor's 
misconduct, defense counsel's failure to object to that 
misconduct and the trial court's failure to cure the misconduct 
in light of its obvious prejudice. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO IMPEACH WITNESS JOHN 
HENDER WITH ACCUSATIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
Upon cross examination of defense witness John Hender, the 
prosecutor accused the witness with unsupported innuendos 
regarding facts not in evidence. (Appellant's Brief at 12-16). 
The State argues that the prosecutor acted properly because the 
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challenged questions were directed to a witness other than the 
accused. (Appellee's Brief at 16). Although the rule, as 
articulated in State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992) 
and State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App. 1993) focuses 
upon the examination of an accused in those instances, State v. 
Peterson extends that similar protection to any witness: 
Impeaching questions should not be propounded to a 
witness unless they are based upon facts that the 
interrogator intends to present in refutation of 
adverse answering of questions propounded; such line of 
questioning should be done in good faith, and not for 
the purpose of prejudicing and arousing suspicion of 
the jury against the defendant. 
Peterson, 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1986)(quoting Riser v. 
State, 67 Okl. Cr.16, 93 P.2d 58 (1939)). This rule mandates 
that questions which are intended to impeach a witness1 testimony 
must have a basis in fact, which basis the interrogator is 
prepared and intends to present. It would be poor public policy 
to allow a prosecutor to concoct a damaging line of questioning 
so imaginative and overzealous that it would leave a jury with 
the impression that a defendant, or defense witness, was anything 
the questions, by innuendo, seemed to suggest. See Emmett at 
787, n.18. 
In the present case, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the 
testimony of John Hender by two improper lines of questioning. 
(Appellant's Brief at pp. 13-16). In short, the State's 
questioning suggested that Mr. Hender had tampered with and 
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threatened a witness. The prosecutor also suggested that the 
witness was an eyewitness to the assault and thus was committing 
perjury because he was not providing truthful testimony as to the 
details of the assault. Again, a felon's denial would be 
outweighed by the prosecutor's suggestions. 
However, as argued and demonstrated in Appellant's Brief at 
pp. 15-17, the prosecutor never presented any admissible evidence 
to substantiate these innuendos. The only plausible purpose for 
this prosecutorial tactic was to prejudice and arouse the jury 
against the defendant and his witnesses. 
The State argues that there was no need for the prosecutor 
to substantiate his questions regarding what Mr. Hender knew 
about the assault because "all the defense witnesses, including 
Hender, knew more about this case than they were willing to say." 
(Appellee's Brief at 19). This conclusory attack is strictly a 
speculative opinion which is unsupported by the record and is 
irrelevant to the issue before this Court. 
Plaintiff also claims that the prosecutor did in fact 
present evidence that Mr. Hender had contacted the victim and 
threatened him. (Appellee Brief at 19). However, the only 
evidence to which the plaintiff refers was the testimony of the 
victim. The testimony is recorded as follows, "(Hender) was a 
trustee at one time. He comes up to me and tells me 'We are 
still threatening you if you are still going to court or not, if 
you do testify against Mr. Carlson.'" (R. 428). This testimony 
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is inadmissible hearsay which should have been objected to by 
defense counsel. 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTORS IMPROPER ASKING OP A WITNESS TO COMMENT ON 
THE CREDIBILITY OF ANOTHER WITNESS CONSTITUTED ERROR. 
Although Emmett refers to a criminal defendant commenting on 
the veracity of another witness, the underlying reasons for the 
rule apply to other defense witnesses other than a defendant. In 
Emmett
 f the Court explained why a question which asks a witness 
to comment on the credibility of another witness is improper and 
prejudicial. The Court stated that: 
The question is improper because it is argumentative 
and seeks information beyond the witness1 competence. 
The prejudicial effect of such a question lies in the 
fact that it suggests to the jury that a witness is 
committing perjury even though there are other 
explanations for the inconsistency. In addition, it 
puts the defendant in the untenable position of 
commenting on the character and motivations of another 
witness who may appear sympathetic to a jury. 
Emmett, at 787. Each of these concerns articulated by the Emmett 
Court are applicable to this case. 
The question, "So if Officer Tonga had come to court and 
said he knew nothing about any wet blanket, how would you explain 
that" is argumentative and seeks inadmissible opinion. The 
question also is prejudicial, despite the sustained objection, 
because it suggests that the witness has perjured himself by 
seeking comparison with an officer. Surely, placing Mr. Hender's 
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testimony in direct conflict with Mr. Tonga's "supposed11 
testimony unfairly calls into question the veracity of Mr. 
Hender's testimony. Since it is well settled that it is improper 
for a defendant to comment on the veracity of the testimony of 
another witness, Emmett at 787, the simple objection by defense 
counsel was insufficient because the damage occurred in the 
asking of the question. By the time the objection was made, the 
damage was already done. 
Plaintiff asserts that any harm which resulted from the 
prosecutor's improper questioning was negligible and not 
prejudicial. Plaintiff relies upon State v. Palmerr wherein this 
Court concluded that although one improper question alone would 
be harmless, five such errors were cumulatively seriously 
harmful. Palmerf 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, 
the errors which this Court focused on in Palmer and found 
cumulatively harmful are remarkably similar to the errors 
challenged here. The Palmer errors include: unsupported innuendo 
in the prosecutor's questions, asking a witness to comment on the 
veracity of another witness, and prosecutorial comments intending 
to cause the jurors to believe there was more evidence of guilt 
than had actually been introduced. Palmer at 350. "While any 
one of these errors would in itself be harmless, their cumulative 
effect is not." Id. 
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Whether the one improper question comparing the witness to 
Officer Tonga may have been harmless by itself, the cumulative 
effect of all of the errors by the prosecutor were not. 
POINT IV 
THE PROSECUTORS EXAMINATION INTO WITNESS DENNIS1 PAST 
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS EXCEEDED ACCEPTABLE INQUIRY UNDER UTAH 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a) 
As set forth in Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19, a prosecutor's 
Rule 609(a) inquiry is limited to the nature of the crime, the 
date of the conviction and the punishment. See State v. Tucker, 
800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990). Plaintiff's brief attempts 
to dismiss the prosecutor's violations of this rule by arguing 
that any violation was technical and not obvious. However, this 
Court stated in Tucker that, "Generally, inquiry into the details 
of prior convictions has been found to be so prejudicial as to 
amount to plain error." Tucker at 821 (citations omitted). The 
only exception to this general rule in Tucker is not applicable 
here. Id. at 882. 
The State, however, attempts to manufacture additional 
"exceptions" to this rule. Appellee argues that the prosecutor 
did not "parade" the details of the prior crime in front of the 
jury and took care to "insure" the witness was not convicted of 
past crimes. (Appellee's Brief at 26). Such "restraint11 by the 
prosecutor is not an excusable exception in Tucker. This Court 
did not suggest that as long as a prosecutor avoided the above 
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courses of action, it could trample the Rule 609(a) limited 
inquiry outlined in Tucker. 
This Court's simple statements that, "A prosecutor may not 
parade the details of the prior crime in front of the jury," and 
"Care must be taken to insure the defendant is not convicted for 
past rather than present crimes," Tucker at 822, cannot be read 
as imposing a new litmus paper test on Rule 609(a) inquiry. 
Therefore, the prosecutor's questions, set out in Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 19-2 0, which went beyond the permissible scope of a 
Rule 609(a) inquiry were prejudicial and amount to plain error. 
I£. at 821. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and this case 
remanded for a new trial. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUEST 
Defendant requests an oral argument regarding the various 
issues presented for review. Utah's law on the prosecutorial 
issues raised in this appeal remains in the formative stage and 
is very fact sensitive. Oral argument will allow the parties to 
clearly set forth their respective positions and respond to any 
questions the Court may have as to the misconduct and Defendant's 
prejudice. 
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Respectfully submitted this ( / day of June 1996. 
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